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INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
-MOTOR VEHICLES
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE AS NOTICE OF LIEN
Kennedy was the holder of a Michigan certificate
of title to an automobile. The certificate named Kennedy as
owner and stated that no liens or encumbrances against the
car existed. To secure a loan, Kennedy executed a chattel
mortgage on the car to a Michigan bank. Though the
bank properly recorded the chattel mortgage on the day of
its execution," it failed to avail itself of the provisions
of a Michigan statute under the terms of which auto-
mobile liens made subsequent to the time of original issue of
the certificate of title could be made to appear on the certifi-
cate. 2 Possession of the car and of the unaltered certificate
of title were retained by Kennedy. Two months after
the execution of the mortgage, Kennedy sold the car
in question to Bogda Motors, whose place of busi-
ness is in Indianapolis. The car was delivered, and the cer-
tificate of title, showing no liens or encumbrances, was as-
signed. Bogda Motors gave full value, and was without actual
knowledge of the existence of the Michigan mortgage. Upon
learning of the removal of the car from the state of Michigan
in breach of the terms of the mortgage agreement, Nichols,
standing in the shoes of the bank, brought this action to re-
plevy the automobile in accordance with the mortgage provis-
ion authorizing the bank to take possession of the car in
the event of Kennedy's failure to comply with the terms
of the instrument. The trial court found for Bogda Motors.
The Appellate Court of Indiana affirmed, declaring that
the bank's failure to secure notation of its security interest
upon the certificate of title precluded recovery. Nichols v.
Bogda Motors, Inc., 77 N. E.2d 905 (Ind. App. 1948).
1. In accordance with the Michigan statute. MIcH. COmp. LAws
§ 13424 (Mason 1929).
2. MicH. COMP. LAWS § 4659 (Mason Cum. Supp. 1945). Whatever
may be the technical distinction between a "lien" and a "mort-
gage," the former word is used in this note as a generic term to
comprehend those security devices which involve no change of
ownership. "Lienor" and "mortgagor' 'are, therefore, here used
interchangeably. The following language from the Michigan
statute gives support to this rather free use of the terms: "Any
lien made subsequently . . . where ownership does not change,
shall become a part of the certificate of title by the filing with the
Secretary of State, of an affidavit of the mortgagee that said
lien has been placed upon the vehicle .... "
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A valid automobile lien, which has been properly recorded
in the state in which the lien was executed, will be enforced
in a state into which the encumbered car is afterwards re-
moved, if the removal is without the knowledge and consent
of the lienor. This is declared to be the law in the great ma-
jority of American jurisdictions; it is said to obtain although
the foreign lienor must try the strength of his security
interest against bona fide purchasers or attaching creditors
in the second state, notwithstanding the fact that the pur-
chaser or creditor may have given full value, and may be
without knowledge that a prior lien exists.3 The principle of
comity, inducing a respect for the validly executed liens of a
sister state, explains the apparent widespread adherence to
the majority rule.4 The Indiana cases on the point indicate
that this state is to be included in the majority.5 Both parties
to the instant case conceded that such was the state of the
law in this jurisdiction.6 The prevailing rule has the salutary
effect of protecting, in each case, the out-of-state lienor
whose debtor has defrauded him. At the same time, the rule
has the extremely harsh effect of cutting off the rights of
innocent purchasers and creditors who deal with the auto-
mobile in the state to which it has been removed. In defense
of the rule, courts which apply it have said that the injustices
which befall innocent purchasers are greatly outweighed by
the benefits accruing to dealers in automobile paper.7
The Indiana Appellate Court did not apply the majority
rule in the principal case; for, with us, apparently, the rule
is to be invoked only in those cases in which the out-of-state
3. See Mercantile Acceptance Co. v. Frank, 203 Cal. 483, 265 Pac.
190, 192 (1928); Ames Iron Works v. Warren, 76 Ind. 512, 513
(1881); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Nuss, 195 La. 209,
214, 196 So. 323, 324 (1940); STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 366
(1937); Beale, Jurisdiction Over Title of Absent Owner in a
Clttel, 40 HARV. L. RaV. 805, 810 (1927). Cf. RESTATBMENT,
CONFLICT OF LAWs § 268, comment c (1934).
4. See Forgan v. Bainbridge, 24 Ariz. 408, 274 Pac. 155, 158 (1928);
Motor Investment Co. v. Breslauer, 64 Cal. App. 230, 221 Pac.
700, 703 (1923); Strubble-Werneke Motor Co., Inc. v. Metropoli-
tan Securities Corp., 93 Ind. App. 416, 427, 178 N. E. 460, 465
(1931).
5. See Struble-Werneke Motor Co., Inc. v. Metropolitan Securities
Corp., 93 Ind. A pp. 416, 427, 178 N. E. 460, 465 (1931) ; Cable Co.
v. McElhoe, 58 3nd. App. 637, 646, 108 N.E. 790, 794 (1915).
6. See Nichols v. Bodga Motors, Inc., 77 N. E.2d 905, 907 (Ind. App.
1948).
7. See Metro Plan, Inc. v. Kotcher-Turner, Inc., 296 Mich. 400, 409,
296 N. W. 304, 307 (1941).
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lienor has taken every step possible in the protection of his
security interest.8 Here the mortgagee, in addition to the
recordation of his lien, might also have secured (in accord-
ance with a Michigan statute)9 notation of the mortgage on
the mortgagor's certificate of title. Having failed to avail
himself of this further statutory safeguard, the mortgagee
must lose the protection which Indiana would otherwise afford
him. A reluctance to cast a loss on an entirely innocent
purchaser has led to the carving out of many exceptions to
the majority rule, with the result that the decisions from
courts purporting to follow the rule quite frequently protect
the bona fide purchaser.1° The reasons those courts give for
their divergences from the prevailing rule are often without
a great deal of substance.- That criticism, it is submitted,
can not be leveled against the court in the instant case, since
it was the mortgagee's omission; in a very real sense, that led
him into difficulty. 12 The decision in the instant case finds
support, as well, in the attitude which Indiana courts have
earlier manifested in similar cases, where the controversies
involved no consideration of conflict of laws rules.' 3 The
8. See Nichols v. Bogda Motors, Inc., 77 N. E.2d 905, 907, 908 (Ind.
App. 1948).
9. See note 2 supra.
10. Prof. Leary of the University of Pennsylvania Law School has
found that in 1947 probably not more than seven reported casesdealt with the general problem presented by the instant case. His
examination of six of those cases, five of which were decided injurisdictions wherein the majority rule is followed, disclosed thatin four of the decisions the local purchaser was protected. Leary,
Horse and Buggy Lien Law and Migratory Automobiles, 96 U.
oF PA. L. Rsv. 455, 456, 457 (1948).
11. For example, in a recent case the court protected the domestic
vendee, stating that inasmuch as the car had been removed from
the lienholder's state before that unfortunate had recorded his
security interest, there was at the time of recording no property
within the state to which the lien could attach. Thus, the domes-tic purchaser was held to have acquired clear title to the auto-.
mobile. General Finance & Thrift Corp. v. Guthrie, 227 N. C.431, 42 S. E.2d 601 (1947). The reasoing employed by the courtin the Guthrie case has been characterized as something akin to
"medieval scholasticism." Leary, supra note 10, at 462. The samedevice appears in M osko v. Smith, 179 P.2d 781 (Wyo. 1947) (buthere there were other reasons for protecting the domestic pur-
chaser). Cf. Ames Iron Works v. Warren, 76 Ind. 512 (1881).
12. For, had the mortgagee secured notation of his lien upon themortgagor's certificate of title, as he might have under theMichigan statut, the certificate itself would then have been
notice to any person subsequently dealing 'with the ear.13. Some of the earlier decisions are referred to in the principal ase.See Nichols v. Bogda iMotors, ., 77 N. E.2d 905, 907 (d. App.
1948).
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doctrine that an estoppel may be raised against a mortgagee
in consequence of his having allowed the mortgagor to con-
tinue to deal in a certain fashion with the mortgaged property
has been inveterate in the common law of this state.14 In-
deed, the doctrine retains its vitality despite the enactment
in 1935, of the Chattel Mortgage Act,15 which statute might
have been supposed to be a repudiation of the common law
learning.',
Questions of practical importance to Indiana dealers in
automobiles and automobile paper are suggested by the sitia-
tion presented in the instant case. Despite the disposition of
courts to avoid the harshness of the majority rule as it applies
to the purchaser, business conduct must be regulated in ac-
cordance with the classic statement of the rule. It is, at pres-
ent, the only available guide. What, then, in the light of the
prevailing rule, must be done by dealers in automobile paper
and by dealers in automobiles to secure the protection of the
law? The instant case suggests that the dealer in automobile
paper may best protect himself by recording his security
interest in accordance with whatever laws exist to aid him in
giving notice to those who may subsequently deal with the
encumbered car. Where the borrower has executed a chattel
mortgage to his lender, the chattel mortgagee, it seems, has
done all in his power to make his lien of record when he has
complied with the filing provisions of the Chattel Mortgage
Act. 7 Our certificate of title act,' 8 unlike the Michigan one
which figured in the instant case, makes no provision for
official recordation on the certificate of encumbrances which
attach after the initial issuance of the certificate.19 It is, of
14. -Indiana Investment and Securities Co. v. Whisman, 85 Ind. App.
109, 138 N. E. 512 (1926); cf. Guaranty Discount Corp. v. Bowers,
94 Ind. App. 373, 158 N. E. 231 (1932) ; LaPorte Discount Corp. v.
Bessinger, 91 Ind. App. 635, 171 N. E. 323 (1930). See Hewins,
Powers of Sale in Chattel Mortgagors, 15 IND. L. J. 506, 510
n.9 (1940).
15. IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns Supp. 1947) § 51-501 et seq.
16. Helms v. American Security Co., 216 Ind. 1, 22 N. E.2d 822(1939).
17. Supra note 15.
18. IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns Supp. 1947) § 47-2501.
19. A conditional sales contract will appear as an encumbrance on
the certificate of title, since it has existence as a lien at the time
of application for the certificate. Our statute on conditional sales
omits provision for recordation of such contracts (when the thing
conditionally sold is an automobile) in any other place. IND. STAT.
ANN. (Burns Repl. 1943) § 58-801 et seq.
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course, possible for the lienor to take up the borrower's
certificate of title and to retain it until the lien is discharged.
While retention of the certificate may be not without psycho-
logical effect upon the borrower, it is nevertheless true that
if the borrower is determined to defraud his lienor he can
easily do so by applying for and receiving from the State a
new certificate to replace his "lost" one. Inasmuch, then, as
our Chattel Mortgage Act provides the only positive means
whereby a chattel mortgagee may record his interest, it must
bd concluded that a chattel mortgagee who complies with the
terms of that statute has done all which the decision in the
instant case would require him to do.20
It seems to be true that some persons who deal in auto-
mobile paper are content to rely upon the good faith of the
borrower. That is to say, the lender may omit filing his
security interest for record, deeming the amount involved too
small to justify litigation in the event of the borrower's de-
campment-and such a lender quite probably considers record-
ation useless unless litigation is contemplated.21 From what
has been said, it is obvious that a lender who thus con-
ducts himself does so at his peril.
What counsel can be given the dealer in automobiles?
The instant case bears an implicit warning to, at least, thefirst purchaser in the state to which the encumbered car has
been removed. A person so circumstanced is impliedly cau-
tioned to buy no out-of-state car without first assuring him-
self that no liens exist against it in the state of its origin;
20. That is to say, compliance with the Chattel Mortgage Act of1935 is all that the chattel mortgagee needs to satisfy the re-quirements of the instant decision with regard to the recordation
of such a security interest. Presumably a mortgagee who had so
recorded his lien would be protected as against purchasers or
creditors in another state, assuming that the second state observed
the practice of comity. Compliance with the terms of the Chat-tel Mortgage Act, however, does not furnish absolute assurance
of protection. At least it has been held not to furnish such pro-tection in an entirely intrastate transaction, where the mortgageedid not sufficiently restrict the use to which the mortgagor was
allowed to put the property. Helms v. American Security Co.,216 Ind. 1, 22 N. E.2d 822 (1939). The rule of the Helms case is
adaptable to use by courts when called upon to adjudicate the
rights of a domestic purchaser or creditor as against an out-of-
state mortgagee. Inclusion in the mortgage of terms restrictingthe manner in which the mortgagor is to deal with the mortgagedproperty is a possible escape from the Helms case rule.
21. Banks, however, must apparently be characterized as circumspectin protecting their security interests. It is the custom of banksin Bloomington, Ind., to record chattel mortgages on the very day
of the instruments'- execution.
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for, if such liens do exist and are recorded in accordance with
the law of the state of origin, the interest of the foreign lienor
will be paramount, nowithstanding the domestic pur-
chaser may have given value and may have been innocent of
knowledge of the prior lien.22 There is nothing harsh in
that admonition. The foreign license plate and the foreign
certificate of title with which the first purchaser is usually
confronted give notice to him that the car recently has been
brought from another state, wherein it may be subject to
validly created liv'as. Possessed of this knowledge, the pros-
pective purchaser can quickly and inexpensively put himself
in touch with the appropriate authorities in the state of origin,
and thus ascertain whether or not the automobile was re-
moved from that state unencumbered. The operation of the
majority rule can not be quarreled with when it casts the
loss on an uninquiring first purchaser.
In only one area does adherence to the prevailing rule
work real injustice. It is in the area in which a subsequent
vendee of the first purchaser (or, the vendee of the absconding
debtor, if the latter has secured license plates and title docu-
ments of the state to which he has removed the car) must
lose the car or its value to the out-of-state lienor. The
subsequent vendee usually buys the automobile after it has
been re-registered in the state to which it has been removed.
Thus, the car bears domestic license plates and a domestic
certificate of title at the time of purchase by the subsequent
vendee. Clearly he is entirely without notice of the existence
of any prior lien, and would be at much trouble and expense
to assure himself that he was receiving a clear title (inasmuch
as only a search of the records of each of the forty-eight
states would establish conclusively the non-existence of liens).
It must be obvious that it is in this area that the exceptions
to the general rule were born.
It is not the purpose of this note to suggest a means
whereby protection may be extended alike to the lienor
who assiduously records his security interest and to the genu-
inely innocent purchaser. That has already been exhaustively
and excellently done.23 Statutes looking toward a solution to
22. This, of course, merely restates the result which would follow an
application of the majority rule.
23. Prof. Leary proposes a solution, the principal requirement of
which is as follows: When application for a new certificate of
title is made to the authorities of the state to which the car has
1948]
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the problem are on the books in a few states. 4 Respecting
the state of the law on the subject in Indiana, it can be said
that the decision in the instant case helps to delimit the area
in which the majority rule is to operate. The opinion warns,
again, that the position of the purchaser of an encumbered
out-of-state automobile is an unenviable and precarious one.
If the result of the case is displeasing to the financing fra-
ternity, it must nevertheless appear to that group that the
decision is of value in that it points out what must be done by
one who would adequately protect his security interest.
been removed, those authorities shall conduct an investigation to
determine the existence of liens in the state in which the car is
then registered. If liens are found to exist in the state from
which the car has been removed, notation thereof shall be made
on the new certificate of title.
This administrative determination of the existence of liens
would obviously be more efficient and speedy if each state were
to institute the scheme of central recording of automobile liens
which Prof. Leary favors.
One contemplating purchase of a car which had been docu-
mented in a state in which the above system obtained would be
at once apprised, by the certificate of title, of the existence of en-
cumbrances. Protection of all parties dealing with the car could
thus be effected. See Leary, supra note 10, at 475 et seq.
It would still be possible, of course, for the dealer in the
second state to purchase an out-of-state car before it had been
re-documented in the second state. In that situation, in the event
of litigation between the lienor and the first purchaser in the
new state, the statute which Prof. Leary favors would cast the
loss on the first purchaser, for it would "provide that anyonedealing with a motor vehicle registered in another state would be
subject to any encumbrances validly created by the law of such
other state, or appearing on record there, unless he made applica-
tion for and received an unencumbered title in his own state."
Leary, supra note 10, at 479.
Recognizing that administrative errors might occur in obtain-
ing and transcribing the information to be included in the new
certificate of title, Prof. Leary suggests that an additional charge
be made for the issuance of the new certificate. That money
would become a sort of insurance fund out of which to compen-
sate lienors who suffer because of such errors. Leary, supra
note 10, at 480, 482.
24. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN., § 57-3a-80 et seq. (1943).
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